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COMMERCIAL NORMS AND THE 
FINE ART OF THE SMALL CON 
Comments on Daniel Keating's 
'Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action' 
Douglas G. Baird* 
The standard battle-of-the-forms story, often rehearsed in the 
classroom, is one in which merchants try to take advantage of their 
contracting opposites. A seller wants to escape the obligations that 
come with implied terms and seeks to disclaim them in its acknowl­
edgment form. Its buyers do not realize they have been had until after 
the goods fail. Only then do they read the seller's form and discover 
that they are without remedy. Conspicuously absent in Dan Keating's 
fine article, however, is any evidence that supports this story.1 Some 
of his merchants talk about putting favorable terms in their forms, but 
only as a way of counteracting the effect of another form. Nothing 
suggests a Darwinian struggle in which each seeks to take advantage 
of another. 
There are several explanations. It is possible that the battle goes 
on, but Keating failed to find it. The large corporations in his sample 
are unlikely to be victims of forms and are unlikely to have general 
counsel that admit to using forms to their benefit. Alternatively, evi­
dence may be missing because existing law does its job, more or less. 
When both parties are even modestly sophisticated, most courts em­
ploy some version of a knockout rule. And, by the time the dust set­
tles, we end up with the Code's default rules.2 Under section 2-207, 
courts do not take what forms say seriously. If courts do not take 
forms seriously, we should not expect the parties to either. If, how­
ever, we create a regime in which we allow parties to opt out of default 
rules easily, the battle may become important. 
* Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School. 
B.A. 1975, Yale; J.D. 1979, Stanford. - Ed. I thank Robert Ellickson, Dan Keating, Ronald 
Mann, Hugh Patinkin, Robert Rasmussen, Carol Rose, and David Skeel for their help, and 
the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for research 
support. 
1. See Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2678 (2000). 
2, See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984). One should 
be careful not to overclaim here. As White & Summers point out, there is no way to inter­
pret section 2-2CJ7 as preventing one party, on some occasions, from imposing terms on the 
other that do not work to their mutual benefit. See 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-3, at 31 (4th ed. 1995). 
2716 
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We should, however, take seriously the possibility that Keating 
found no evidence because the battle of the forms and related activi­
ties are not important vehicles for those inclined to advantage-taking. 
If the risk that merchants will use forms to their advantage is small, we 
should, as we talk about revising section 2-207, focus.more of our at­
tention on the way legal rules can help parties shape terms in ways 
that work to their mutual benefit.3 The less we think that advantage­
taking is a problem, the more we will be able to provide a set of rules 
that enable parties to customize terms. Trading one concern off 
against another is inevitable. Indeed, the failure of section 2-207 stems 
in large measure from the drafters trying to make one section do too 
much work.4 
In these comments, I identify the terrain on which the battle of the 
forms operates and suggest that, once we take the motivations of those 
inclined to mischief into account, we should be wary of focusing too 
much on parties taking advantage of each other with forms. The 
problem likely exists in some measure and ensuring against the worst 
abuses is prudent, but we need to keep the problem in perspective. 
You make more money by selling people things that they do not 
need than you do by pretending to give them what they want and then 
taking it away in fine print. Harold Hill in The Music Man made his 
money by persuading a town that it needed a boy's band. He did not 
seek out places where people already wanted to buy seventy-six trom­
bones and then proceed to sell them defective ones. A vision of com­
mercial law that worries excessively about the ability of parties to 
sneak terms past each other distracts us from the things that matter. 
I. THE TERRAIN ON WHICH THE BATILE OF THE FORMS 
IS FOUGHT 
It is a commonplace that legal rules do not operate in a vacuum. 
To understand the effects of a battle-of-the-forms rule, we first need 
to identify the forces that already are at work. There are two impor­
tant forces that limit the mischief that might be done through the use 
of forms: the constraints that norms impose and the constraints of le­
gal sanctions outside of commercial law, such as those for fraud and 
misrepresentation. 
3. For an examination of how such diversity might work in the consumer context, see 
George L. Priest, A Theory of Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE LJ. 1297 (1981). 
4. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the 
Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982). 
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Commercial law rules affect only those who are around for the 
long term. Those interested in making a quick killing are likely to be 
out of the jurisdiction or judgment-proof by the time people catch up 
with them.5 Once a person leaves the jurisdiction or is judgment­
proof, causes of action do not matter. Rules governing the battle of 
the forms matter only when the person who wins the battle remains on 
the scene. 
Those who are in business for any length of time, however, must 
worry about their reputations. The cases in which legal sanctions mat­
ter are those in which reputational forces are necessarily also at work.6 
Moreover, parties are most likely to invest in their reputations in envi­
ronments where the other party fears advantage-taking. An experi­
ence in my own life brought this lesson home to me. 
Many years ago, towards the end of his life, my father wanted to 
give my mother a piece of jewelry on her birthday. An emerald and 
diamond pin he saw in a Tiffany's catalogue caught his eye, and he 
clipped out the picture and sent it to Norm, a jeweler with whom he 
previously had done business. Norm made a similar pin for a price 
that, while less than Tiffany's, was hardly insubstantial, and my father 
entrusted it to me for safekeeping. 
I had never been impressed with Norm. Norm had a small and 
somewhat seedy shop, and much of his business was in wholeselling 
items such as tasteless pins in the shape of an American flag with semi­
precious red, white, and blue stones. Moreover, the opportunity for 
advantage-taking was nontrivial. My father was in search of a deal. 
He wanted a pin like the one from Tiffany's, but for less. Addition­
ally, he was quite ill and did not know much about jewelry. He was 
not in a position to cast a sharp eye on the transaction. 
Because of my doubts (and because I interpreted my father's 
charge to care for the pin broadly), I took it to a well-known jeweler 
on North Michigan Avenue in Chicago. This jeweler examined the 
pin closely and, after some study, shook his head and told me he had 
bad news. Emeralds were a very soft stone and mounting them this 
way was extremely tricky. Unfortunately (but not surprisingly), two of 
the emeralds had fractured while being mounted. He handed me a 
magnifying glass and invited me to see for myself. I thought I saw 
what he was talking about, but was not sure. The jeweler suggested 
that I return the pin and ask to have the emeralds replaced. 
5. From the time of Charles Ponzi to the present day, con artists are usually broke by 
the time they can be brought to court. See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924). 
6. This observation, of course, is not new. The locus c/assicus in this literature remains 
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
Soc. REV. 55 (1963). 
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At that moment, I had little hope that Norm would replace the 
stones. The flaws were invisible or nearly so. I was not sure I could 
persuade Norm that the fractures were there. Moreover, the price my 
father paid and the problems with the mount might be connected with 
each other. We acquired the pin at a favorable price, because the 
quality was not first-rate. We should not have thought that the pin 
from Norm would be comparable to one from Tiffany's. I said as 
much to the Michigan Avenue jeweler, more or less expecting him to 
agree and suggest, with some condescension, that, in the future, we 
should rely on upscale jewelers like him. His response, however, was 
nothing of the sort. A dark look came over him, as if I had impugned 
his entire profession. "Your jeweler will replace the stones. I am not 
talking about the design or the quality of the stones. The emeralds 
have fractures in them. It doesn't matter what you paid. A jeweler 
would never knowingly let such a pin leave his store. Never." · 
I did not have to explain to Norm why I was returning the pin. Be­
fore I said anything, Norm examined the pin. After a few moments, 
he stopped, took what seemed a long time to collect his thoughts, and 
then began to talk. He owed me an apology. He had let my father 
down. The emeralds had fractures in them, and the pin should never 
have left the shop. The fault, he told me, was entirely his. He had not 
personally inspected the pin. This had been his practice for decades, 
but of late he had started to delegate too much business to his sons. 
They weren't ready. Then he asked for my mother's birthday. He 
needed to find new stones and wanted to be sure the pin was ready in 
time. 
Like other merchants, jewelers are constrained by powerful norms. 
Norm's shop was seedy, because he was largely in the wholesale busi­
ness. The jeweler on North Michigan Avenue had a fancy shop and a 
reputation. All Norm had was his reputation. Jewelers have to care 
intensely about their reputations precisely because their goods are 
hard to assess. The same force that made us vulnerable (our inability 
to judge the pin on our own) also made it much more important for 
Norm to build a reputation that is put at risk if commercial norms are 
broken. 
We need to assess default rules such as the implied warranty of 
merchantability against this backdrop. It might have been possible to 
bring an action against Norm if he refused to replace the emeralds. 
The pin, after all, did not pass without objection in the trade.7 But the 
same norm that gave rise to the legal right made it unnecessary. For 
all I knew, Norm had a form that disclaimed the implied warranty of 
merchantability, but such a disclaimer was irrelevant as long as reputa­
tional forces ensured that he would make amends if his goods did not 
pass in his trade. 
7. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (1999). 
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In addition to the need to preserve a reputation for fair dealing, 
other forces are at work. Among the most important are criminal 
sanctions. A jeweler in Norm's position could, in theory, have pro­
vided us with fake stones and escaped detection most of the time. 
Similarly, he could have provided stones that weighed less or were of a 
different grade than he represented. These forms of advantage-taking, 
however, rely on affirmative misrepresentations that give rise to 
criminal sanctions.8 It takes only one customer to get a second opinion 
for the entire business to unravel. 
Apart from criminal sanctions, other legal rules constrain those 
who are tempted to engage in affirmative misrepresentations. A seller 
cannot make a set of representations during the course of selling a 
product and then seek to escape legal liability by adding terms in 
forms. Rules governing false advertising and fraud prevent such de­
liberate misconduct.9 Moreover, representations that become part of 
the basis of the bargain are express warranties under U.C.C. section 2-
313, and cannot be disclaimed. Similarly, limitations on liability for 
personal injury from consumer goods cannot easily be evaded either.10 
Rules governing forms matter only if the contracting party is 
around long enough to be subject to the legal process, but not con­
strained by norms. Moreover, the advantage-taking must fall short of 
deliberate misrepresentations that trigger other legal regimes. The 
advantage-taking at which battle-of-the-forms rules have to be aimed 
must fall into the gap between these forces. The game that is being 
played is a "small con." One sells substandard products or services 
and escapes responsibility when things go badly through the fine print. 
One makes money, not by making a big lie, but by appearing to offer 
one thing, while actually being obliged to supply something far less. 
We focus on this sort of advantage-taking in the next part. 
II. PRINCIPLES OF THE SMALL CON 
The advantage-taking of concern to us is analogous to an unscru­
pulous seller offering insurance to the unsophisticated. The limita­
tions on coverage in the fine print are not contrary to what the seller 
represented, but in the aggregate they insulate the insurer from liabil­
ity in the cases that matter. Most people who buy insurance never file 
any claims. They are none the wiser. The few that make claims dis-
8. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 190.20(McKinney 1999). 
9. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW§ 350-a (1988 & Supp. 2000). 
10. Among other things, it is presumptively unconscionable under U.C.C. § 2-719(3). 
As White and Summers have put it, "we suspect that whenever a consumer's blood is spilled, 
even wild horses could not stop a sympathetic court from plowing through the most artfully 
drafted and conspicuously printed disclaimer clause . . . .  " 1 WlilTE & SUMMERS, supra note 
2, § 12-12, at 681. In such a world, unscrupulous sellers are not going to count on language in 
forms to protect them. 
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cover that they are not covered, but they think it their bad luck to 
have suffered a misfortune that was beyond the coverage of the policy. 
They also disappear. 
Misbehavior of this sort undoubtedly exists in the sale of goods. 
The question, however, is whether it arises often enough such that 
curbing such abuse should be our primary objective. One way to ap­
proach this question is to look at the motivations of those inclined to 
mischief.11 We are concerned about the advantage-taking that is too 
small to be stopped by reputational forces and too venial to fall within 
criminal and regulatory sanctions. 
A. The Willie Sutton Principle 
Our legal system embodies a general reluctance to review a trans­
action to assess the fairness of the price at which goods are sold. Con­
sumers may, on occasion, be able to argue that the terms of a transac­
tion are substantively unconscionable.12 Merchants may have a 
remedy under the antitrust laws if a seller has acquired its monopoly 
position illegitimately. In the main, however, parties are free to sell 
their goods at whatever price they please.13 
I can sell a necklace for $15,000, even if others sell virtually the 
same piece for $10,000. I can sell a laptop computer for the same price 
as my competitors and not disclose that my disk drive is cheaper, my 
chips are slower, and my housing is less sturdy. I can charge $5 a fifth 
for my standard brand of vodka and $10 for the premium brand, even 
if they come from the same tap. Our unwillingness to review these 
transactions undoubtedly gives some people the ability to take advan­
tage of others. 
We tolerate this state of affairs because the game is not worth the 
candle. Allowing review of the price charged after the fact is not that 
much different from price regulation. We have little confidence that 
the government will be able to control prices effectively. As a concep­
tual matter, this principle suggests we should be reluctant to make it 
hard for parties to opt out of default terms. We need to explain why 
regulation of terms is different from price regulation. 
Courts and legislatures may be no more able to identify the type of 
warranty that should accompany a good than they can identify the 
price at which goods can be sold. A seller might try to take advantage 
11. The idea that we can use the practices of swindlers as a lens to examine co=ercial 
behavior begins with ARTHUR ALLEN LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING (1976). 
12 See, e.g., American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964). 
White and Su=ers, however, report that, of late, even these cases have "dwindled to a 
trickle." 1 WlllTE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 4-5, at 223. 
13. Again, one wants to be careful not to overclaim. Courts sometimes do take action 
when they perceive an exchange to be gravely one-sided. See James Gordley, Equality in 
Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1587, 1649-55 (1981). 
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of me by selling me a laptop computer with components that are not 
as good as that of a competitor's. Alternatively, this seller might try to 
sell the same computer, but with less favorable warranty terms and 
more limited remedies. A coherent approach to the battle of the 
forms and similar problems has to be able to explain why we need to 
worry about the second case, but not the first.14 
The freedom that a seller has to vary the price and quality of the 
goods brings an additional puzzle. We have to explain why someone 
who wants to take advantage of others plays games with warranties 
(and the remedies that are available in the event of breach), rather 
than price. The law does nothing to prevent someone from taking a 
product that is not so well made (even though it is not so bad as to 
violate implied warranties or give rise to any other contract remedy) 
and charge as much as the market will bear. Given this freedom, sell­
ers may often discover that they gain little by disclaiming warranties 
and limiting damages. When it is easy to take advantage of buyers 
without violating any warranties or breaking any promises, remedies 
for breach are not so important. 
For most goods, the chance of defects that give rise to warranty ac­
tions and the like is low. The "insurance" that implied terms provide 
is only a small part of the total package. With few goods is it likely to 
be worth even ten percent of the price of the goods. A seller intent on 
taking advantage of buyers should have many better ways of short­
changing buyers other than playing with forms. Goods that are fungi­
ble are easy to inspect and, hence, the implied warranty matters little. 
For complex goods such as computers, it is easy to use low quality ma­
terials (such as slower chips) and shave costs in this way, rather than 
try to use forms. In more competitive markets, buyers may be sensi­
tive to chip speeds, but they are likely to ask about warranties as well 
and, as we have seen, affirmative misrepresentations about these in­
dependently trigger legal liability. The Code's default terms are an in­
surance policy that is tied to the sale of something else worth ten times 
as much. For sellers inclined to mischief, the stakes involved with de­
fault terms are an order of magnitude smaller than the goods them­
selves. They are not likely to invest their energy here. 
Even when warranties matter, it does not follow that badly moti­
vated sellers seek to avoid them. Quite the contrary. Just as an un­
scrupulous seller can provide second-rate (but merchantable) goods at 
a premium price, the same seller can provide a second-rate warranty 
(often called a "service contract") at a premium price.15 Once one is 
committed to the idea that we are not going to assess whether the 
14. The idea here - that a warranty can be treated as another product attribute - is a 
familiar one. See Arthur Allen Leff, Contract As Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970). 
15. See Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract 
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983). 
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price being charged is appropriate given the service that is being ren­
dered, the law is limited in what it can do. 
Legal rules can make buyers' lives easier by requiring various pro­
visions to be conspicuous. Buyers benefit when competing sellers 
highlight their own terms. But it is hard for legal rules to do more. In 
any event, the potential for abuse with warranties in many markets is 
not so much that sellers will disclaim them, but rather that they will of­
fer them, charge too much, and limit them in ways that are hard to 
regulate. General rules governing forms in contracting are not well 
suited to dealing with such problems. 
Once when veteran bank robber Willie Sutton was arrested, a re­
porter asked why he robbed banks. Willie told him, "That's where the 
money is." If one wants to take advantage of people and profit by it, 
one naturally looks to arenas that promise the most in the way of 
profits. The battle of the forms may not be such a venue. We can re­
turn to my experience with Norm. 
If Norm had been inclined towards sharp practices, he had many 
chances to take advantage of us without disclaiming legal obligations. 
The pin was custom-made. My father had no benchmark other than 
the Tiffany's price to assess whether Norm was charging a fair price. 
If Norm were inclined to take advantage of my father, he simply could 
have charged more for it. Alternatively, he could have used cheaper 
stones or lower quality mounts. These avenues would not have put his 
reputation at risk to nearly the same extent. 
B. Roping the Mark 
"Big cons" are confidence games in which a single individual is 
separated from a lot of money. They depend crucially on finding rich 
people willing to enter schemes that are illicit in one way or another.16 
Small cons, in contrast, often focus on the weak and the poor. One 
gets rich by cheating many people a little bit at a time. Disclosure 
rules can make this harder. We can curtail some of the abuse with 
regulations that force disclosures. The Truth-in-Lending Act requires 
that the annual percentage rate be disclosed.17 The Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act requires warranty disclaimers to be made conspicu­
ously.18 We also regulate the way goods are packaged and labeled.19 
16. See W.T. BRANNON, "YELLOW KID" WEIL 293-94 (1948). 
17. 15u. s. c. §1632 (1994). 
18. 15 u. s. c. §§ 2301-2312 (1994). 
19. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 392-d (McKinney 1996). Yellow Kid Weil's moni­
ker came from his practice of selling gold-plated watches and cheap jewelry for large 
amounts using the story that he was trying to unload stolen goods. See DAVID W. MAURER, 
THE BIG CON: THE STORY OF TIIE CONFIDENCE MAN AND TIIE CONFIDENCE GAME 274 
(1940). Weil credited a large part of his success in this venture to the absence of legal rules 
that prevented manufacturers from stamping any thing they pleased on watches and jewelry. 
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In such a world, a successful con artist has to identify a discrete set 
of people who are vulnerable. Marketing goods to the whole does not 
allow one to do this. An unscrupulous seller has a hard time taking 
advantage of the ignorant if they are buying the same goods in the 
same marketplace as Fortune 500 companies. It is sometimes thought 
that consumers are worse off when they buy in a mass market and are 
forced to take terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.20 In many cases, ex­
actly the opposite is true. Unsophisticated consumers are often better 
off in a market in which no one can bargain for special terms than in a 
market where everyone can. I am more likely to enjoy terms that are 
mutually beneficial when I buy a computer with terms that the manu­
facturer imposes on everyone, including large companies, than when I 
and every other customer can dicker with the same manufacturer indi­
vidually. Hence, sellers inclined to mischief in the terms they use are 
not likely to enter markets where they deal with a broad array of po­
tential buyers on identical terms. 
Far more promising are arenas in which gullible buyers can be 
separated from savvy ones. General rules governing the use of pre­
printed terms do little with respect to places where abuse is likely and 
too much where it is not. The legal rules that curb misbehavior most 
effectively are often ones that regulate discrete markets. Misleading 
statements made in connection with the sale of insurance is subject to 
special criminal sanctions.21 Consumer credit is closely regulated.22 
We are much more likely to be successful if we regulate door-to-door 
sales practices by insisting on cooling-off periods for such sales.23 We 
may be better off banning cross-collateralization clauses as unfair 
trade practices than we would be allowing individual buyers to assert 
that such clauses are substantively unconscionable.24 
C. Cooling Out the Mark 
The key to playing any con game is ensuring that the deception 
lasts long enough. A large part of the swindler's craft lies in his ability 
to do this. It is known as "cooling out the mark."25 When one is en­
gaged in a less-than-honorable transaction in the marketplace and is 
See BRANNON, supra note 16, at 9. Later in life, he boasted that he was in some measure 
responsible for many of these laws. See id. at 295. 
20. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). 
21. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 176.05(McKinney 1999). 
22. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §§ 444.1-44 .5 (2000). 
23. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2000). 
24. The unconscionability holdings of cases like Williams v. Walker-Thomas F11rnit11re 
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), are made largely unnecessary by 16 C.F.R. §§ 444.1-444.5. 
25. See LEFF, supra note 11, at 87, 100, 154 & 160; MAURER, s11pra note 19, at 279. 
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subject to legal action, keeping marks happy is especially important. 
The best cons are the ones in which the marks never know that they 
have been swindled.26 It is not as hard as it might seem. People want 
to believe that they have received a good deal. They do not want to 
think that they have been duped. Even when they know they have 
been cheated, they do not want others to know and are reluctant to 
invoke whatever legal rights they have on that account. 
To return to the example of the emerald pin, let us assume that we 
have a jeweler with bad motives. In addition to, or instead of, using 
inferior stones and other tactics that do not violate any implied terms, 
this jeweler wants to profit by selling jewels with fractures in them. 
Such a jeweler can rely in the first place upon most buyers never 
checking the goods out. Among other things, buyers as a general mat­
ter believe in their own powers of judgment.27 The spouse that re­
ceives the pin as a birthday gift is unlikely to have suspicions either. 
Even when buyers have suspicions, the unscrupulous often can allay 
them, especially with respect to details (such as nearly invisible frac­
tures) that require expertise. 
The worst-case scenario may be one in which a third party enters 
the picture unexpectedly, such as an over-eager lawyer-academic pos­
sessed of a strong sense of filial obligation, a large amount of suspi­
cion, and plenty of free time. Even in this case, however, the unscru­
pulous need not rely on legal niceties. In such cases, they may be 
better off fixing (or pretending to fix) the defect, rather than insisting 
that they do not have to. 
Buyers invoke their rights under implied terms such as the war­
ranty of merchantability only if they know that their goods are defec­
tive. If there are express promises, disclaimers of off-the-rack terms 
are irrelevant. If the buyer never notices the defect, the implied war­
ranty does the buyer no good. Even if the buyer learns about the de­
fect, the warranty again matters only if the seller insists on holding the 
buyer to the preprinted forms. To win the battle of the forms, the un­
scrupulous must ultimately be willing to invoke defenses such as dis­
claimers and remedy limitations in open court. Con men, however, 
rarely want to do this and in any event cannot count on success, quite 
apart from the letter of the law. 
The latest attempt to replace section 2-207 seems to take these 
concerns into account. On its face, it does seem to focus on advan­
tage-taking. If terms in material accompanying a product contradict 
26. Indeed, it is often hard to convince a mark that he has been "knocked" (i.e., 
cheated). See MAURER, supra note 19, at 285. As Maurer explains, "[i]f the insideman han­
dles the blow-off properly, the mark hardly knows that he has been fleeced. No good in­
sideman wants any trouble with a mark. He wants him to lose his money the 'easy way' 
rather than the 'hard way' . . . .  " Id. at 157. 
27. See id. at 133. 
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the terms of the parties' agreement or materially alter the contract to 
the detriment of the buyer, they do not bind the buyer. Moreover, the 
terms that accompany the goods become part of the contract only sev­
eral weeks after the buyer receives the goods. Before that time, buy­
ers can return the goods at the seller's expense. These provisions, 
however, are likely to interfere little with sellers who want to depart 
from default terms in ways that are mutually beneficial. We know that 
the risk that a buyer will ship the goods back is trivial and the limita­
tions on what terms become part of the contract, if sensibly inter­
preted, should not affect sellers trying to craft terms that are mutually 
beneficial. We may end up with a provision that, in substance, allows 
merchants to customize terms. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Attempts to regulate the battle of the forms focus on the wrong 
place, an arena in which there is relatively less profit for the unscru­
pulous, and the wrong mechanism, a cause of action for money dam­
ages by those who often do not even know they have been cheated. 
To be sure, some can get the better of others with forms, but those 
who seek to profit at the expense of others are not likely to focus their 
efforts here. 
Richard Sears of Sears-Roebuck fame grew rich by selling cata­
logue goods with money-back guarantees. One of his popular prod­
ucts was the Heidelberg Belt, an electrical device that was buckled 
around the waist. If the belts did not cure their impotency, buyers 
were free to return them. Only three ever did. As Sears observed to­
ward the end of his life, "[h]onesty is the best policy. I know. I've 
tried it both ways."28 
28. DONALD R. KATZ, THE BIG STORE: INSIDE THE CRISIS AND REVOLUTION AT 
SEARS 9-10 (1987). 
